

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 130467

71

ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY INR:WGHYLAND

APPROVED BY INR:WGHYLAND

S/S:SEFRY

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

S, P, S/P, INR AND C ONLY

----- 069448

O 182252Z JUN 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 130467

EXDIS TOSEC 350

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:US,PFOR

SUBJECT:

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE US-SOVIET SUMMIT

TO SONNENFELDT, LORD, PALMER FROM HYLAND

1. FOLLOWING IS NEW INTRODUCTION.
 2. BEGIN TEXT
 3. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION NEXT WEEK COMES AT AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT JUNCTURE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
 4. THE DOMESTIC DEBATE IN THIS COUNTRY OVER THE MEANING OF DETENTE AND ITS FURTHER EVOLUTION HAS RAISED SOME FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS BOTH AT HOME AND IN MOSCOW.
 5. I WANT TO BEGIN BY CLARIFYING FOR THIS COMMITTEE WHAT WE CONCEIVE TO BE THE PURPOSES OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW WE HOPE TO PURSUE IT IN THE MOSCOW MEETINGS.
- SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 130467

6. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSFORMED. IN THE POSTWAR ERA WHEN THERE WERE LONG

PERIODS OF EXTREMELY HIGH TENSIONS AND CONFRONTATION, IT WAS CONSIDERED AN ACHIEVEMENT MERELY TO LOWER TENSIONS AND DIMINISH THE CONFRONTATION. INDEED, THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF SOME OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. IN 1974, HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR HAS BEEN MARKED BY A STEADY IMPROVEMENT IS MORE OR LESS TAKEN FOR GRANTED, AND MANY ARE TEMPTED TO SEEK MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVES.

7. I MIGHT NOTE THAT THE DEBATE OVER CHANGING THE SOVIET DOMESTIC STRUCTURE AS AN OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE IN 1969.

8. THE POLICY WE HAVE PURSUED WAS BORN OF NECESSITY -- THE NECESSITY IN AN AGE OF A VAST ACCUMULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF WAR, TO LIMIT THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, IN PARTICULAR, AND TO INCREASE THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE. ANY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION MUST SOONER OR LATER COME BACK TO SUCH A POLICY.

9. OUR AIM THEREFORE HAS BEEN TO WORK OUT WITH THE SOVIET UNION A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON CERTAIN MODES OF BEHAVIOR, TO PUT OUR RELATIONS ON A MORE NORMAL BASIS, AND IN THIS SENSE TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY.

10. WE HAVE PURSUED THESE AIMS IN THREE INTERRELATED AREAS:

11. FIRST, IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO BROADEN THE INTERCOURSE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS OVER A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. OUR HOPE IS THAT IN DOING SO, BOTH SIDES WILL BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO THE HABIT OF COOPERATION BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT ENDEAVOR, RATHER THAN ASSUMING FROM THE OUTSET THAT ANY US-SOVIET PROJECT WAS BY DEFINITION POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 130467

12. SECOND, WE HAVE PURSUED ARMS CONTROL BY DEALING FIRST WITH THE GROWTH IN STRATEGIC FORCES AND NOW TURNING TO THE MORE COMPLEX ISSUES OF QUALITATIVE CHANGE; WE HAVE ENTERTAINED AGREEMENTS NOT ONLY IN THE STRATEGIC REALM BUT IN OTHER AREAS: SEABEDS ARMS CONTROL, THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL WAR, THE HOT LINE, AND LIMITING NUCLEAR TESTING.

13. THIRD, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS HOW EACH OF US SHOULD CONDUCT OURSELVES IN THE WORLD; OUR CONCEPT WAS THAT A COMPETITIVE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL GAINS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER, NO MATTER HOW TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, IN THE END COULD ONLY LEAD TO CONFRONTATION AND DISASTER.

14. THUS, WE HAVE URGED THE COURSE OF MODERATION AND RESTRAINT, REFLECTED IN THE AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES SIGNED IN 1972 AND IN THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR SIGNED LAST YEAR.

15. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT IN EACH OF THESE AREAS WE HAVE REGISTERED SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOVE FROM A RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERIZED BY CONFRONTATION TO ONE CHARACTERIZED MORE BY RESTRAINT, WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF MOVING TO A RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE WE HAVE GROUNDED PROGRESS IN SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS ALLEVIATING CONCRETE SOURCES OF CONFLICT AND TENSIONS AND BECAUSE WE HAVE MAINTAINED AN INTERDEPENDENCY AMONG ALL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC.

16. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE SUMMIT MEETING THIS YEAR WILL PROVIDE FURTHER IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A MORE STABLE, ORDERLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. END NEW TEXT, AND PICK UP TEXT IN FIRST SUBPARAGRAPH, PAGE 1.

17. INSERT FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PARA, TO REPLACE FIRST PARA TOP OF PAGE 3, WHICH SHOULD BE DROPPED.
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 130467

18. BEGIN TEXT. FINALLY, THE SUMMIT IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE LEADERS OF THE TWO MOST POWERFUL COUNTRIES TO HOLD A CANDED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS AND PARTICULARLY ON WHAT STEPS ARE REQUIRED TO PRESERVE THE PEACE.

19. TEXT THEN PICKS UP WITH PARA ON PAGE 3 BEGINNING, "THE MEETING THIS YEAR..."

20. FOLLOWING TEXT TO BE INSERTED AFTER FIRST FULL PARA ON PAGE 5.

21. BEGIN TEXT. WITH RESPECT TO SALT AND THE SUMMIT, I WANT TO LAY TO REST CERTAIN MISAPPREHENSIONS. FIRST, THERE IS THE QUESTION WHETHER AN AGREEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED BECAUSE OF THE FACT THE SUMMIT IS TAKING PLACE. OUR ATTITUDE HAS BEEN NOT TO RUSH AN AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO COMPLETE IT BY THE SUMMIT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME NOT FAIL TO CONSOLIDATE PROGRESS SIMPLY BECAUSE THE SUMMIT OCCURS AT A TIME OF INTENSE DOMESTIC DEBATE.

22. ANY AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WILL HAVE TO PASS THE SCRUTINY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS. ANY AGREEMENT THAT IS

MADE NOW OR LATER WILL HAVE TO BE DEFENDED ON ITS MERITS. WE ARE DEALING WITH MATTERS OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL, AND THIS CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE DEALT WITH IN AN IRRESPONSIBLE MANNER.

23. THE SALT ISSUES ARE EXTREMELY COMPLEX FOR TWO REASONS:

24. FIRST, WE ARE MOVING FROM LIMITS ON NUMBERS TO CONSTRAINTS ON THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS, INCLUDING SUCH TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES AS MULTIPLE WARHEADS, MISSILE THROW WEIGHT AND ACCURACY.

25. SECOND, WE ARE DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF QUITE DIFFERENT HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES ON EACH SIDE, AND DEFINING AN ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THESE FORCES IS EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLICATED,
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 130467

INVOLVING BOTH INTRICATE TECHNICAL ASSESSMENTS AND HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DECISIONS.

26. THE STARTING POINT FOR THE PRESENT PHASE IS THE FACT THAT WE HAVE THE ABM TREATY AND THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND IN PARTICULAR WHAT WAS ACHIEVED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, SINCE ONE OF THE ISSUES IS WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND IT FOR A PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH A SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT LIMITING MIRVS.

27. THERE IS NOTHING DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE CURRENT INTERIM AGREEMENT. INDEED, IT WAS A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT IN BREAKING THE MOMENTUM OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILD UP.

28. AT THE TIME THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, THE FACT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO PROGRAM FOR DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL LAND-BASED MISSILES. WE HAD NO IMMEDIATE PROGRAM FOR BUILDING ANY SEA BASED MISSILES. OUR ICBMS AND SLBM FORCE HAS STABILIZED AT 1710, AND OUR MAIN EFFORT WAS IN THE PROGRAM TO CONVERT A PART OF THESE FORCES TO MULTIPLE WARHEADS. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THEREFORE STOPPED NO ACTIVE US PROGRAM.

29. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET UNION WAS ENGAGED IN A VAST BUILD UP OF BOTH ITS ICBM AND SLBM FORCES. THE SOVIETS WERE DEPLOYING ABOUT 90 LAND BASED MISSILES EACH YEAR AND OVER 140 SEA BASED MISSILES. I HAVE RECENTLY

READ A PROJECTION THAT ESTIMATED THAT THE USSR BY 1977 WOULD HAVE REACHED A LEVEL OF OVER 3,000 ICBMS AND SLBMS IF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAD NOT FROZEN THAT LEVEL AT ABOUT 2360. MOREOVER, THAT AGREEMENT HAD THE ADDED PRO-

VISION THAT TO REACH THIS CEILING BY BUILDING NEW SLBMS
OVER 200 OLDER ICBMS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED.

30. IT IS SOMETIMES ALLEGED, HOWEVER, THAT WE CONCEDED TOO
LARGE OF A NUMERICAL GAP. THIS ANALYSIS TOTALLY IGNORES
THE FACT THAT WHEN THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED WE HAD A
HEAVY BOMBER FORCE OF OVER 600. MOREOVER, IF THE STRATEGIC
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 130467

BALANCE IS ANALYZED IN TERMS OF WARHEADS, THE US LEAD IS
AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE OVERWHELMING FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD
OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND BEYOND.

31. IT IS BELIEVED BY SOME THAT WE ONLY ACCEPTED THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF OUR ADVANTAGES IN MIRVS AND
THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET TESTING PROGRAMS FOR MIRVS
INVALIDATES THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT OUR TECHNOLOGICAL
LEAD FOR THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT.

32. IN 1972 WE WERE WELL AWARE THAT IN TIME THE
SOVIETS WOULD DEVELOP MIRV SYSTEMS. I WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE
TO YOU THE TESTIMONY ON THE SALT AGREEMENTS OF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BEFORE THIS
COMMITTEE ON JUNE 21, 1972: QUOTE GIVEN THE TECHNOLOGY
WHICH WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION
EITHER HAS OR IS ACQUIRING, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THEY
WILL MOVE VIGOROUSLY INTO MIRV'S, BOTH IN THEIR ICBM'S
AND SLBM'S. THE CONSIDERABLY GREATER 'THROW WEIGHT' OR
PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF THE SOVIET MISSILE FORCE, PARTICULARLY
THE SS-9 TYPE MISSILE, IS ESPECIALLY ADAPTABLE TO THIS
TASK. IT IS STILL ANTICIPATED THAT THEY WILL CONSIDERABLY
NARROW OUR LEAD IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF WARHEADS BY THE
LATE 1970'S. HOWEVER, THE RESTRAINT ON THEIR DEPLOYING
MORE THAN THE 313 SS-9 TYPE MISSILES NOW OPERATIONAL OR
UNDER CONSTRUCTION WILL IMPACT UPON THIS GROWTH. HERE WE
BENEFIT FROM BOTH WHAT WE FREEZE AND WHAT WE FORESTALL.
UNQUOTE.

33. THIS LEADS US TO THE CURRENT PHASE. PICK UP TEXT
ON PAGE 5, WITH SECOND PARA.

34. REPLACE FIRST PARA PAGE 6 "WE DECIDED, ETC." WITH
FOLLOWING: THE QUESTION IS WHETHER IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING
TECHNOLOGY ONE CAN BREAK OUT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT,
WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERALL GOAL, THOSE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
WHICH IF NOT DEALT WITH SOON, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
DEAL WITH AT ALL -- BECAUSE TECHNOLOGY WILL HAVE ADVANCED

TO THE POINT AFTER WHICH CONTROL WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE AND
DEPLOYMENTS WILL REACH A POINT WHERE NO RELIABLE VERIFICA-
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 130467

TION CAN BE ACHIEVED. THIS IS THE OVERRIDING ISSUE. ONCE THESE MULTIPLE WARHEADS ARE FULLY DEPLOYED AT LEVELS OF 10,000, THEN THERE WILL BE AN ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITIES. THIS IS WHAT WE WOULD HOPE TO REDUCE THROUGH AGREEMENT. CONTINUE TEXT ON PAGE 6.

35. FOLLOWING TEXT REPLACES FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS ON PAGE 13.

36. THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION IS THAT U.S.-SOVIET REDUCTIONS SHOULD PRECEDE THOSE OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS, AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN TWO PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BE LIMITED TO REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES BY 15 PERCENT, THE SECOND WOULD INCLUDE THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO A COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 700,000 TROOPS.

-- THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WITH FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE VERY OUT-SET. THE WARSAW PACT HAS PROPOSED AN INITIAL STAGE OF REDUCTIONS OF 20,000 MEN BY EACH SIDE IN 1975, WITH SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE PROPORTIONALLY BY THE TWO SIDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS -- FIVE PERCENT TO BE FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER TEN PERCENT. THE EAST HAS INSISTED THAT ALL FORCES BE INCLUDED IN THESE REDUCTIONS; WE BELIEVE THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON GROUND FORCES.

37. RECENTLY, WE HAVE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A FREEZE ON NON-U.S., NON-SOVIET FORCES PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO AN INITIAL FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AS WE PROPOSE. FURTHER, THE ALLIES HAVE SAID THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSURE THE EAST THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF NON-U.S., NON-SOVIET FORCES WOULD BEGIN WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER A FIRST PHASE FOCUSING ON OUR FORCES AND THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

38. THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN SOME WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FROM THEIR STATED POSITION. THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT A SYMBOLIC INITIAL STEP COULD BE MADE -- AS THEY EXPRESS
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 130467

IT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FORMAL POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE -- WHICH COULD BE LIMITED TO U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A REDUCTION SHOULD BE ON EQUAL NUMERICAL BASIS, ON THE MAGNITUDE OF 20,000 FORCES FOR THE U.S. AS WELL AS THE USSR.

39. THE CURRENT ISSUE THEREFORE IS HOW WE CAN GIVE THESE

TALKS AN IMPETUS -- WHETHER WE SHOULD WAIT TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OR TO MAKE A START WITH A MORE MODEST REDUCTION. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE THAT ALL THE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED BY THE SAME NUMBER. NATO IS IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND SIMPLY LOWERING THE CURRENT BALANCE WOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY DANGEROUS.

40. IT IS POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES COULD BE SINGLED OUT FOR A REDUCTION BY A

SMALL PERCENTAGE IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SOME MOMENTUM. REDUCTIONS IN THE RANGE OF 5-10 PERCENT, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD INVOLVE CUTS OF 10,000-20,000 FOR THE U.S. AND 20,000-40,000 FOR THE USSR. ON SUCH A BASIS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO EXAMINE HOW TO HANDLE REDUCTION OR LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT AND HOW TO ADDRESS THE RATIO FOR REDUCING THE OTHER FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE -- ALL OF COURSE WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF REACHING A ROUGH PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

41. AT THE SUMMIT, WE WILL BE READY TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IF NEW IDEAS DO EMERGE WE WOULD OF COURSE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES. BROWN

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, DETENTE, COMMITTEES, SUMMIT MEETINGS, CHIEF OF STATE VISITS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE130467
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: INR:WGHYLAND
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740159-0051
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740688/abbryzoc.tel
Line Count: 350
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 APR 2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <01 AUG 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE US-SOVIET SUMMIT
TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, (NIXON, RICHARD M)
To: OTTAWA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005